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Abstract
The idea of preserving conditional beliefs emerged re-
cently as a new paradigm apt to guide the revision of
epistemic states. Conditionals are substantially differ-
ent from propositional beliefs and need specific treat-
ment. In this paper, we present a new approach
to conditionals, capturing particularly well their dy-
namic part as revision policies. We thoroughly axiom-
atize a principle of conditional preservation as an in-
difference property with respect to conditional struc-
tures of worlds. This principle is developed in a semi-
quantitative setting, so as to reveal its fundamental
meaning for belief revision in quantitative as well as
in qualitative frameworks. In fact, it is shown to cover
other proposed approaches to conditional preservation.
Introduction
Within the last years, the propositional limitations
of classical belief revision have been overcome piece
by piece. For instance, Boutilier (Boutilier 1994) in-
vestigated belief revision within a modal framework,
and Williams (Williams 1994) proposed transmutation
schemas for knowledge systems. In general, epistemic
states have moved into the center of interest as repre-
sentations of belief states of some individual or intel-
ligent agent at a given time. Besides propositional or
first-order facts, reflecting certain knowledge, they may
contain assumptions, preferences among beliefs, and,
as a crucial ingredient, conditional knowledge. They
may be represented in different ways, e.g. by gradings
of plausibility or disbelief, by making use of epistemic
entrenchment, or as a probability distribution.
Epistemic states provide an excellent framework to
study iterative revisions which are important to build
fully dynamic systems1. While propositional AGM the-
ory only observes the results of revisions, considering
epistemic states under change allows one to focus on
the mechanisms underlying that change, taking con-
ditional beliefs as revision policies explicitly into ac-
count (cf. (Boutilier & Goldszmidt 1993; Rott 1991;
1An interesting approach to iterated revisions of belief
sets was proposed quite recently by Lehmann, Magidor and
Schlechta in (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 1999).
Darwiche & Pearl 1997)). The connection between epis-
temic states, Ψ, (iterative) revision operators, ∗, and
conditionals, (B|A), is established by the Ramsey test
Ψ |= (B|A) iff Ψ ∗A |= B. (1)
Hence revising epistemic states does not only mean to
deal with propositional beliefs – it also requires study-
ing how conditional beliefs are changed.
Darwiche and Pearl (Darwiche & Pearl 1997)
rephrased the AGM postulates for epistemic states. Ap-
plying the minimal change paradigm of propositional
belief revision in that extended framework, as Gold-
szmidt and Boutilier did in (Boutilier & Goldszmidt
1993), however, may produce unintuitive results (Dar-
wiche & Pearl 1997). So, Darwiche and Pearl (Darwiche
& Pearl 1997) advanced four postulates as a cautious
approach to describe principles of conditional preser-
vation when revising epistemic states by propositional
beliefs. In (Kern-Isberner 1999c; Kern-Isberner 1999b),
we extended their approach in considering revisions of
epistemic states by conditionals. We proposed a set
of axioms outlining conditional revisions which are in
accordance with some fundamental postulates of revi-
sions (like, for instance, success) and with propositional
AGM theory, and which preserve conditional beliefs in
observing conditional interactions. These interactions
were specified by two newly introduced relations be-
tween conditionals, that of subconditionality and that
of perpendicularity (see (Kern-Isberner 1999b)).
Earlier, in (Kern-Isberner 1998), we defined a prin-
ciple of conditional preservation in quite a different,
namely probabilistic, framework. This principle there
was based on the algebraic notion of conditional struc-
tures, made use of group theoretical means and postu-
lated the numerical values of the given probability dis-
tribution to follow the conditional structures of worlds.
In this paper, we will bring together both approaches
to conditional preservation, the qualitative one and
the quantitative one, in the semi-quantitative frame-
work of ordinal conditional functions. We will rephrase
the probabilistic principle of conditional preservation
of (Kern-Isberner 1998) for ordinal conditional func-
tions, and we will show, that this quantitative principle
of conditional preservation implies the corresponding
qualitative postulates of (Kern-Isberner 1999b). Ac-
tually, the quantitative version is much stronger than
the qualitative one, dealing with sets of conditionals
instead of only one revising conditional, and handling
interactions of conditionals of arbitrary complexity. Al-
though numerical in nature, the principle is based on
a symbolic representation of conditional influences on
worlds, called conditional structures. Numbers (rank-
ings or probabilities) are only considered as manifesta-
tions of complex conditional interactions. The represen-
tation of conditional structures by the aid of group the-
ory provides a rich methodological framework to study
conditionals in belief revision and nonmonotonic rea-
soning.
In the following section, we fix some notations and
describe the relationship between conditionals and epis-
temic states. Then we introduce the crucial notion of
conditional structures which the property of conditional
indifference is based upon. By applying the concept of
indifference to revision functions, we obtain a precise
formalization of the principle of conditional preserva-
tion, and we characterize ordinal conditional functions
observing this principle. Further on, we compare our
approach to Goldszmidt, Morris & Pearl’s system-Z and
system-Z∗ in several examples. Finally, we bring to-
gether qualitative and quantitative approaches to the
principle of conditional preservation, proving the for-
malization given here to be a most fundamental one. A
summary and an outlook conclude this paper.
Conditionals and epistemic states
We consider a propositional language L over a finite
alphabet a, b, c . . .. Let Ω denote the set of possible
worlds for L, i.e. Ω is a complete set of interpretations
of L. Throughout this paper, we will write A instead of
¬A, and AB instead of A ∧B, for formulas A,B ∈ L.
Conditionals (B|A) represent statements of the form
“If A then B”, expressing a relationship between two
(propositional) formulas A, the antecedent or premise,
and B, the consequent. (L | L) denotes the set of all
conditionals (B|A) with A,B ∈ L. A conditional (B|⊤)
with a tautological antecedent is taken to correspond
to its (propositional) consequent, B. (D|C) is called a
subconditional of (B|A), written as
(D|C) ⊑ (B|A), (2)
iff CD |= AB and CD |= AB. Typically, subcon-
ditionals arise by strengthening the antecedent of a
conditional, e.g. (b|ac) is a subconditional of (b|a),
(b|ac) ⊑ (b|a).
Each possible world ω ∈ Ω either confirms (B|A), in
case that ω |= AB, or refutes it, if ω |= AB, or does
not even satisfy its premise, ω 6|= A, and so is of no rel-
evance for it. Although conditionals are evaluated with
respect to worlds, they cannot really be accepted (as
entities) in single, isolated worlds. To validate condi-
tionals, we need richer epistemic structures than plain
propositional interpretations, at least to compare dif-
ferent worlds with regard to their relevance for a con-
ditional (see, for example, (Nute 1980; Boutilier 1994;
Darwiche & Pearl 1997)). Epistemic states as represen-
tations of cognitive states of intelligent agents provide
an adequate framework for conditionals.
An epistemic notion that turned out to be of great
importance both for conditionals and epistemic states,
in particular in the context of belief revision, is that
of plausibility: conditionals are supposed to represent
plausible conclusions, and plausibility relations on for-
mulas or worlds, respectively, guide AGM-revisions of
belief sets and of epistemic states (Nute 1980; Katsuno
& Mendelzon 1991; Darwiche & Pearl 1997).
As Spohn (Spohn 1988) emphasized, however, it
is not enough to consider the qualitative ordering of
propositions according to their plausibility – also rel-
ative distances between degrees of plausibility should
be taken into account. So he introduced ordinal condi-
tional functions κ (OCF’s, ranking functions) (Spohn
1988) from worlds to ordinals such that some worlds are
mapped to the minimal element 0. Here, we will simply
assume that OCF’s are functions κ : Ω → N ∪ {0,∞}
from the set of worlds to the natural numbers, ex-
tended by 0 and ∞. They specify non-negative in-
tegers as degrees of plausibility – or, more precisely,
as degrees of disbelief – for worlds. The smaller κ(ω)
is, the more plausible the world ω appears, and what
is believed (for certain) in the epistemic state repre-
sented by κ is described precisely by the set Mod (κ) :=
{ω ∈ Ω | κ(ω) = 0}. For propositional formulas
A,B ∈ L, we set κ(A) = min{κ(ω) | ω |= A},
so that κ(A ∨ B) = min{κ(A), κ(B)}. In particular,
0 = min{κ(A), κ(A)}, so that at least one of A or A
is considered mostly plausible. A proposition A is be-
lieved iff κ(A) > 0, which is denoted by κ |= A. A
conditional (B|A) ∈ (L | L) may be assigned a degree
of plausibility via κ(B|A) = κ(AB)−κ(A). Each OCF
κ induces a (propositional) AGM-revision operator ∗
by setting Mod (κ ∗ A) = minκ(Mod (A)) (see (Dar-
wiche & Pearl 1997)). The Ramsey test (1) then reads
κ |= (B|A) iff κ ∗ A |= B. This is in accordance with
the plausibility relation imposed by κ, as the following
lemma shows:
Lemma 1 Let (B|A) be a conditional in (L | L), let κ
be an ordinal conditional function. Then κ |= (B|A)
(by applying the Ramsey test) iff κ(AB) < κ(AB).
So κ accepts a conditional (via the Ramsey test) iff AB
is more plausible than AB. The proof of this lemma is
immediate.
Conditional structures
By observing the behavior of worlds with respect to
it, each conditional (B|A) can be considered as a gen-
eralized (namely three-valued) indicator function on
worlds:
(B|A)(ω) =

1 : ω |= AB
0 : ω |= AB
u : ω |= A
(3)
where u stands for undefined (DeFinetti 1974; Calabrese
1991)). Intuitively, incorporating a conditional as a
plausible conclusion in an epistemic state means to
make – at least some – worlds confirming the condi-
tional more plausible than the worlds refuting it. In this
sense, conditionals to be learned have effects on possible
worlds (more exactly, on their degrees of plausibility),
shifting them appropriately to establish the intended
plausible relationship. (3) then provides a classifica-
tion of worlds for achieving this: On confirming worlds
ω |= AB, i.e. (B|A)(ω) = 1, (B|A) possibly has a pos-
itive effect, while on refuting worlds ω |= AB, (B|A)
possibly has a negative effect; the effects on worlds ω
with (B|A)(ω) = u is unclear. Which worlds will actu-
ally be shifted depends on the chosen revision procedure
– for the conditional, all worlds in either of the parti-
tioning sets are indistinguishable.
When we consider (finite) sets of conditionals R =
{(B1|A1), . . . , (Bn|An)} ⊆ (L | L), we have to modify
the representation (3) appropriately to identify the ef-
fect of each conditional in R on worlds in Ω. This leads
to introducing the functions σi = σ(Bi|Ai) below (see
(4)) which generalize (3) by replacing the numbers 0
and 1 by abstract symbols. Moreover, we will make use
of a group structure to represent the joint impact of
conditionals on worlds.
To each conditional (Bi|Ai) in R we associate two
symbols a+i , a
−
i . Let
FR = 〈a
+
1 , a
−
1 , . . . , a
+
n , a
−
n 〉
be the free abelian group with generators
a+1 , a
−
1 , . . . , a
+
n , a
−
n , i.e. FR consists of all elements of
the form (a+1 )
r1(a−1 )
s1 . . . (a+n )
rn(a−n )
sn with integers
ri, si ∈ Z (the ring of integers). Each element of FR can
be identified by its exponents, so that FR is isomorphic
to Z2n (Lyndon & Schupp 1977). The commutativity
of FR corresponds to the fact that the conditionals in
R shall be effective simultaneously, without assuming
any order of application. So our way of dealing with
conditionals is a symmetric, homogeneous one – we do
not need (user-defined) priorities among conditionals.
Note that, although we will speak of multiplication
and products in FR, the generators of FR are merely
juxtaposed, like words.
For each i, 1 6 i 6 n, we define a function σi : Ω →
FR by setting
σi(ω) =
 a
+
i if (Bi|Ai)(ω) = 1
a−i if (Bi|Ai)(ω) = 0
1 if (Bi|Ai)(ω) = u
(4)
σi(ω) represents the manner in which the conditional
(Bi|Ai) applies to the possible world ω. The neutral
element 1 of FR corresponds to the non-applicability of
(Bi|Ai) in case that the antecedent Ai is not satisfied.
The function σR : Ω→ FR,
σR(ω) =
∏
16i6n
σi(ω) =
∏
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
a+i
∏
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
a−i
describes the all-over effect of R on ω. σR(ω) is called
(a representation of) the conditional structure of ω with
respect to R. For each world ω, σR(ω) contains at most
one of each a+i or a
−
i , but never both of them because
each conditional applies to ω in a well-defined way. The
next lemma (which is easy to prove) shows that this
property characterizes conditional structure functions:
Lemma 2 Let σ : Ω → F be a map from the
set of worlds Ω to the free abelian group F =
〈a+1 , a
−
1 , . . . , a
+
n , a
−
n 〉 generated by a
+
1 , a
−
1 , . . . , a
+
n , a
−
n ,
such that σ(ω) contains at most one of each a+i or a
−
i ,
for each world ω ∈ Ω. Then there is a set of condition-
als R with card (R) 6 n such that σ = σR.
Example 3 Let R = {(c|a), (c|b)}, where a, b, c are
atoms, and let FR = 〈a
+
1 , a
−
1 , a
−
2 , a
−
2 〉. We associate
a±1 with the first conditional, (c|a), and a
±
2 with the
second one, (c|b). The following table shows the values
of the function σR on worlds ω ∈ Ω:
ω σR(ω) ω σR(ω)
abc a+1 a
+
2 abc a
+
2
abc a−1 a
−
2 abc a
−
2
abc a+1 abc 1
abc a−1 abc 1
abc confirms both conditionals, so its conditional struc-
ture is represented by a+1 a
+
2 . This corresponds to the
product (in FR) of the conditional structures of the
worlds abc and abc. Two worlds, namely abc and abc,
are not affected at all by the conditionals in R.
The logical structure of antecedents and consequents
of the conditionals in R does not really matter, nor
do logical relationships between the conditionals. All
that we need is a conditional’s partitioning property on
the set of worlds (cf. (3) and (4)). σR labels each world
appropriately and allows us to compare different worlds
with respect to the impact the conditionals in R exert
on them. The following example illustrates that also
multiple copies of worlds may be necessary to relate
conditional structures:
Example 4 Consider the set R = {(d|a), (d|b), (d|c)}
of conditionals using the atoms a, b, c, d. Let a±1 , a
±
2 , a
±
3
be the group generators associated with (d|a), (d|b),
(d|c), respectively. Then we have
σR(abcd)σR(abcd)σR(abcd) = (a
+
1 a
+
2 )(a
+
1 a
+
3 )(a
+
2 a
+
3 )
= (a+1 )
2(a+2 )
2(a+3 )
2 = (a+1 a
+
2 a
+
3 )
2
= σR(abcd)
2.
Here two copies of abcd, or of its structure, respectively,
are necessary to match the product of the conditional
structures of abcd, abcd and abcd.
To compare worlds adequately with respect to their
conditional structures, we take the worlds ω ∈ Ω as
formal generators of the free abelian group
Ω̂ := 〈ω | ω ∈ Ω〉
Ω̂ consists of all products ω̂ = ω1
r1 . . . ωm
rm , with
ω1, . . . , ωm ∈ Ω, and r1, . . . rm integers. Introducing
such a “multiplication between worlds” is nothing but
a technical means to comply with the multiplicative
structure the effects of conditionals impose on worlds.
As in FR, multiplication in Ω̂ actually means juxtaposi-
tion. In (Kern-Isberner 1998), where we first developed
these ideas, we considered multi-sets of worlds (corre-
sponding to elements in Ω̂ with only positive exponents)
and calculated the conditional structure of such a multi-
set as the conditional weight it is carrying. Making use
of arbitrary elements of Ω̂ as group elements, however,
provides a much more convenient and elegant frame-
work to deal with conditional structures. We will usu-
ally write
ω1
ω2
instead of ω1ω
−1
2 .
Now σR may be extended to Ω̂ in a straightforward
manner by setting
σR(ω̂) = σR(ω1)
r1 . . . σR(ωm)
rm ,
yielding a homomorphism of groups σR : Ω̂→ FR. For
ω̂ = ω1
r1 . . . ωm
rm ∈ Ω̂, we obtain
σR(ω1
r1 . . . ωm
rm) =∏
16i6n
(a+i )
∑
k:σi(ωk)=a
+
i
rk
∏
16i6n
(a−i )
∑
k:σi(ωk)=a
−
i
rk
,
as a representation of its conditional structure. The
exponent of a+i in σR(ω̂) indicates the number of worlds
in ω̂ which confirm the conditional (Bi|Ai), each world
being counted with its multiplicity, and in the same way,
the exponent of a−i indicates the number of worlds that
are in conflict with (Bi|Ai).
By investigating suitable elements of Ω̂, it is possi-
ble to isolate the (positive or negative) net impacts of
conditionals in R , as the following example illustrates:
Example 5 (continued) In Example 3 above, we have
σR(
abc
abc
) =
a+1 a
+
2
a+2
= a+1
So
abc
abc
reveals the positive net impact of the conditional
(c|a) within R, symbolized by a+1 .
Similarly, in Example 4, the element
abcd · abcd
abcd
iso-
lates the negative net impact of the second conditional,
(d|b):
σR
(
abcd · abcd
abcd
)
=
a−1 a
−
2 · a
−
3
a−1 a
−
3
= a−2 .
The following example is taken from (Goldszmidt &
Pearl 1996, p. 68f):
Example 6 Consider the set R consisting of the fol-
lowing conditionals:
r1 : (f |b) Birds fly.
r2 : (b|p) Penguins are birds.
r3 : (f |p) Penguins do not fly.
r4 : (w|b) Birds have wings.
r5 : (a|f) Animals that fly are airborne.
In Table 1, we list the conditional structures of all
ω σR(ω) ω σR(ω)
pbfwa a+1 a
+
2 a
−
3 a
+
4 a
+
5 pbfwa a
+
1 a
+
4 a
+
5
pbfwa a+1 a
+
2 a
−
3 a
+
4 a
−
5 pbfwa a
+
1 a
+
4 a
−
5
pbfwa a+1 a
+
2 a
−
3 a
−
4 a
+
5 pbfwa a
+
1 a
−
4 a
+
5
pbfw a a+1 a
+
2 a
−
3 a
−
4 a
−
5 pbfw a a
+
1 a
−
4 a
−
5
pbfwa a−1 a
+
2 a
+
3 a
+
4 pbfwa a
−
1 a
+
4
pbfwa a−1 a
+
2 a
+
3 a
+
4 pbfwa a
−
1 a
+
4
pbfwa a−1 a
+
2 a
+
3 a
−
4 pbfwa a
−
1 a
−
4
pbfw a a−1 a
+
2 a
+
3 a
−
4 pbfw a a
−
1 a
−
4
pbfwa a−2 a
−
3 a
+
5 pbfwa a
+
5
pbfwa a−2 a
−
3 a
−
5 pbfwa a
−
5
pbfwa a−2 a
−
3 a
+
5 pbfwa a
+
5
pbfw a a−2 a
−
3 a
−
5 pbfw a a
−
5
pb fwa a−2 a
+
3 pb fwa 1
pb fwa a−2 a
+
3 pb fwa 1
pb fwa a−2 a
+
3 pb fwa 1
pb fw a a−2 a
+
3 pb fw a 1
Table 1: Conditional structures for Example 6
possible worlds; this table will be helpful in the sequel.
Having the same conditional structure defines an
equivalence relation ≡R on Ω̂:
ω̂1 ≡R ω̂2 iff σR(ω̂1) = σR(ω̂2). (5)
Those elements of Ω̂ that are balanced with respect to
the effects of conditionals in R are contained in the ker-
nel of σR, ker σR = {ω̂ ∈ Ω̂ | σR(ω̂) = 1}. ker σR does
not depend on the chosen representation of conditional
structures by symbols in FR and thus, it is an invariant
of R (Kern-Isberner 1999d).
Often, besides the conditionals explicitly given in
R, implicit normalizing constraints have to be taken
into account, like, e.g. κ(⊤) = 0 for ordinal con-
ditional functions. This can be achieved by focus-
ing on equivalence with repect to σ⊤. Since σ⊤ sim-
ply counts the generators occurring in ω̂, two ele-
ments ω̂1 = ω
r1
1 . . . ω
rm
m , ω̂2 = ν
s1
1 . . . ν
sp
p ∈ Ω̂ are σ⊤-
equivalent, ω̂1 ≡⊤ ω̂2, iff
∑
16j6m rj =
∑
16k6p sk.
This means, ω̂1 ≡⊤ ω̂2 iff they both are a (cancelled)
product of the same number of generators, each gener-
ator being counted with its corresponding exponent.
Conditional indifference
To study conditional interactions, we now focus on the
behavior of OCF’s κ : Ω → N ∪ {0,∞} with respect
to the multiplication in Ω̂. Each such function may be
extended to a homomorphism, κ : Ω̂+ → (Z,+), by
setting
κ(ω1
r1 · . . . · ωm
rm) = r1κ(ω1) + . . .+ rmκ(ωm),
where Ω̂+ is the subgroup of Ω̂ generated by the set
Ω+ := {ω ∈ Ω | κ(ω) 6= ∞}. This allows us to analyze
numerical relationships holding between different κ(ω).
Thereby, it will be possible to elaborate the conditionals
whose structures κ follows, that means, to determine
sets of conditionals R ⊆ (L | L) with respect to which
κ is indifferent:
Definition 7 Suppose κ : Ω → N ∪ {0,∞} is an
OCF, and R ⊆ (L | L) is a set of conditionals such that
κ(A) 6= ∞ for all (B|A) ∈ R. κ is indifferent with
respect to R iff the following two conditions hold:
(i) If κ(ω) = ∞ then there is (B|A) ∈ R such that
σ(B|A)(ω) 6= 1 and κ(ω
′) = ∞ for all ω′ with
σ(B|A)(ω
′) = σ(B|A)(ω).
(ii) κ(ω̂1) = κ(ω̂2) whenever σR(ω̂1) = σR(ω̂2) for
ω̂1 ≡⊤ ω̂2 ∈ Ω̂+.
If κ is indifferent with respect to R ⊆ (L | L), then it
does not distinguish between different elements ω̂1, ω̂2
with the same conditional structure with respect to
R. Normalizing constraints are taken into account by
observing ≡⊤-equivalence. Conversely, any deviation
κ(ω̂) 6= 0 can be explained by the conditionals in R
acting on ω̂ in a non-balanced way. Condition (i) in
Definition 7 is necessary to deal with worlds ω /∈ Ω+.
Conditional indifference, as defined in Definition 7, cap-
tures interactions of conditionals of arbitrary depth by
making use of the homomorphism induced by κ. It also
respects, however, indifference on the superficial level
of the function κ itself:
Lemma 8 If the ordinal conditional function κ is in-
different with respect to R, then σR(ω1) = σR(ω2) im-
plies κ(ω1) = κ(ω2) for all worlds ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω.
The next theorem gives a simple criteria to check
conditional indifference with ordinal conditional func-
tions. Moreover, it provides an intelligible schema to
construct conditional indifferent functions.
Theorem 9 An OCF κ is indifferent with respect to
a set R = {(B1|A1), . . . , (Bn|An)} of conditionals iff
κ(Ai) 6= ∞ for all i, 1 6 i 6 n, and there are rational
numbers κ0, κ
+
i , κ
−
i ∈ Q, 1 6 i 6 n, such that for all
ω ∈ Ω,
κ(ω) = κ0 +
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
κ+i +
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
κ−i (6)
Sketch of proof. According to Lemma 8, the equiva-
lence relation (5) provides a rough classification of the
worlds in Ω with respect to the conditionals in R. Ob-
taining a representation of the form (6) then amounts
to checking the solvability of a linear equational system.
The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof of
the analogous theorem for probabilistic representation
of knowledge given in (Kern-Isberner 1998). ✷
The principle of conditional preservation
Minimality of change is a crucial paradigm for belief
revision, and a “principle of conditional preservation” is
to realize this idea of minimality when conditionals are
involved in change. Minimizing absolutely the changes
in conditional beliefs, as in (Boutilier & Goldszmidt
1993), is an important proposal to this aim, but it does
not always lead to intuitive results (Darwiche & Pearl
1997). The idea we will develop here rather aims at
preserving the conditional structure of knowledge within
an epistemic state which we assume to be represented
by an OCF κ.
We just explained what it means for an OCF κ to fol-
low the structure imposed by R on the set of worlds by
introducing the notion of conditional indifference (cf.
Definition 7). Pursuing this approach further in the
framework of belief revision, a revision of κ by simulta-
neously incorporating the conditionals inR, κ∗ = κ∗R,
can be said to preserve the conditional structure of κ
with respect to R if the relative change function κ∗−κ
is indifferent with respect to R2. Taking into regard
the worlds ω with κ(ω) = ∞ appropriately, this gives
rise to the following definitions:
Definition 10 Let κ be an OCF, and let R be a finite
set of conditionals. Let κ∗ = κ ∗R denote the result of
revising κ by R. Presuppose further3 that κ∗(A) 6= ∞
for all (B|A) ∈ R.
1. κ∗ is called κ-consistent iff κ(ω) =∞ implies κ∗(ω) =
∞.
2. κ∗ is indifferent with respect to R and κ iff κ∗ is κ-
consistent and the following two conditions hold:
(i) If κ∗(ω) = ∞ then κ(ω) =∞, or there is (B|A) ∈
R such that σ(B|A)(ω) 6= 1 and κ
∗(ω′) =∞ for all
ω′ with σ(B|A)(ω
′) = σ(B|A)(ω).
(ii) (κ∗− κ)(ω̂1) = (κ
∗− κ)(ω̂2) whenever σR(ω̂1) =
σR(ω̂2) and ω̂1 ≡⊤ ω̂2 for ω̂1, ω̂2 ∈ Ω̂
∗
+, where
Ω̂∗+ = 〈ω ∈ Ω | κ
∗(ω) 6=∞〉.
The principle of conditional preservation is now realized
as an indifference property:
Definition 11 Let κ be an OCF, and let R be a finite
set of conditionals. A revision κ∗ = κ ∗ R satisfies the
principle of conditional preservation iff κ∗ is indifferent
with respect to R and κ.
So κ ∗ R satisfies the principle of conditional preser-
vation if any change in plausibility is clearly and unam-
bigously induced by R. The next theorem characterizes
2Why just κ∗ − κ? First, it is more accurate than, e.g.,
max{0, κ∗ − κ}, in the sense of taking differences in degrees
of plausibility seriously. Second, it makes use of the condi-
tional “−”, considering revision as a generalized conditional
operation; for more details, see (Kern-Isberner 1999d).
3Note that success κ∗ |= R is not compulsory for con-
ditional indifference and conditional preservation. We only
presuppose κ∗(A) 6=∞ for all (B|A) ∈ R in order to exclude
pathological cases.
revisions of ordinal conditional functions that satisfy
the principle of conditional preservation. The theorem
is obvious by observing Theorem 9.
Theorem 12 Let κ, κ∗ be OCF’s, and let R =
{(B1|A1), . . . , (Bn|An)} be a (finite) set of conditionals
in (L | L). A revision κ∗ = κ ∗ R satisfies the princi-
ple of conditional preservation iff κ∗(Ai) 6= ∞ for all
i, 1 6 i 6 n, and there are numbers κ0, κ
+
i , κ
−
i ∈ Q, 1 6
i 6 n, such that for all ω ∈ Ω,
κ∗(ω) = κ(ω) + κ0 +
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
κ+i +
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
κ−i (7)
Comparing Theorems 9 and 12 with one another, we
see that an OCF κ is indifferent with respect to a finite
set of conditionalsR iff it can be taken as a revision κ0∗
R satisfying the principle of conditional preservation,
where κ0(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω is the uniform ordinal
conditional function.
Up to now, we have not yet taken the success condi-
tion κ∗ |= R into regard, postulating that the revised
OCF in fact represents the conditionals in R.
Definition 13 Let κ, κ∗ be OCF’s, and let R be a
set of conditionals. κ∗ = κ ∗ R is called a c-revision
iff κ∗ |= R and κ∗ satisfies the principle of conditional
preservation. κ is called a c-representation of R, iff
κ |= R and κ is indifferent with respect to R.
Theorems 9 and 12 provide simple schemes to con-
struct c-revisions and c-representations. The numbers
κ0, κ
+
i , κ
−
i ∈ Q, 1 6 i 6 n, then have to be chosen ap-
propriately to ensure that κ(∗) is an ordinal conditional
function, and such that κ(∗)(AB) < κ(∗)(AB) for all
conditionals (B|A) ∈ R (cf. Lemma 1). In the spe-
cial case that κ is a representation of R, we obtain the
following corollary by some easy calculations:
Corollary 14 Let R = {(B1|A1), . . . , (Bn|An)} be a
(finite) set of conditionals in (L | L), and let κ be an
OCF.
κ is a c-representation of R iff κ(Ai) 6= ∞ for all
i, 1 6 i 6 n, and there are numbers κ0, κ
+
i , κ
−
i ∈ Q, 1 6
i 6 n, such that for all ω ∈ Ω,
κ(ω) = κ0 +
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
κ+i +
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
κ−i , (8)
and
κ−i − κ
+
i > min
ω|=AiBi
 ∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ−j
(9)
− min
ω|=AiBi
 ∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ−j

Proof. κ is a c-representation of R iff κ |= R and κ
is indifferent with respect to R. From Theorem 9, we
obtain representation (8). Due to Lemma 1, κ |= R iff
κ(AiBi) < κ(AiBi), i.e. iff
min
ω|=AiBi
κ0 +
∑
16j6n
ω|=AjBj
κ+j +
∑
16j6n
ω|=AjBj
κ−j
< min
ω|=AiBi
κ0 +
∑
16j6n
ω|=AjBj
κ+j +
∑
16j6n
ω|=AjBj
κ−j ,
which is equivalent to
min
ω|=AiBi
κ+i +
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ−j
< min
ω|=AiBi
κ−i +
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ+j +
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ−j .
This shows (9). ✷
The difference κ−i − κ
+
i , or the right hand side of (9),
respectively, measures the effort needed to establish
the i-th conditional. To calculate suitable constants
κ+i , κ
−
i , we apply the following heuristics: To estab-
lish conditional beliefs, one can make confirming worlds
more plausible (if required, which amounts to choose
κ+i 6 0), or refuting worlds less plausible (if required,
which means κ−i > 0). The normalizing constant κ0
then has to be chosen appropriately to ensure that ac-
tually an OCF is obtained.
We prefer the second alternative, presupposing
κ−i > 0, and κ
+
i = 0 for 1 6 i 6 n (10)
Then (9) reduces to
κ−i > min
ω|=AiBi
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ−j − min
ω|=AiBi
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
κ−j (11)
for 1 6 i 6 n. If there are worlds ω with neutral con-
ditional structure, σR(ω) = 1, we may set κ0 = 0. So,
we obtain a c-representation of R via
κ(ω) =
∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
κ−i , (12)
where the κ−i have to satisfy (11).
Example 15 We will use Corollary 14 and the heuris-
tics (10) to obtain a c-representation (12) of the con-
ditionals R = {r1, . . . , r5} of Example 6. To calcu-
late constants κ−i according to (11), Table 1 proves to
be helpful. We only have to focus on the a−-labels of
worlds, and we obtain
κ−5 , κ
−
4 , κ
−
1 > 0,
κ−3 > min{κ
−
1 , κ
−
2 }, κ
−
2 > min{κ
−
1 , κ
−
3 }
So we set
κ−5 = κ
−
4 = κ
−
1 = 1, κ
−
2 = κ
−
3 = 2. (13)
Since there are also worlds ω with σR(ω) = 1 (cf. Table
1), we set κ0 = 0. So we obtain a c-representation of
r1, . . . , r5 by
κ(ω) =
∑
16i65
ω|=AiBi
κ−i , (14)
where the Ai, Bi’s are the antecedents and consequents
of the rules ri and the κ
−
i are defined as in (13) for
1 6 i 6 5 (see also Table 2 in Example 16 below).
A comparison with system-Z and
system-Z∗
A well-known method to represent a (finite) set R =
{ri = (Bi|Ai) | 1 6 i 6 n} of conditionals by an OCF is
to apply the system-Z of Goldszmidt and Pearl (Gold-
szmidt & Pearl 1992; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1996). The
corresponding ranking function κz is given by
κz(ω) =
{
0, if ω does not falsify any ri,
1 + max
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
Z(ri), otherwise (15)
where Z is an ordering on R observing the (logical) in-
teractions of the conditionals (for a detailed description
of Z, see, for instance, (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1996)). κz
assigns to each world ω the lowest possible rank ad-
missible with respect to the constraints in R. Com-
paring (15) with (6), we see that in general, κz is not
a c-representation of R, since in its definition (15),
maximum is used instead of summation (see Exam-
ple 16 below). The numbers Z(ri), however, may well
serve to define appropriate constants κ−i in (6). Setting
κ0 = κ
+
i = 0, and κ
−
i = Z(ri) + 1 for 1 6 i 6 n, we
obtain from Z a c-representation κzc of R via
κzc(ω) =

0, if ω does not falsify any ri,∑
16i6n
ω|=AiBi
(Z(ri) + 1), otherwise. (16)
An even more sophisticated representation is ob-
tained by combining the system-Z approach with the
principle of maximum entropy (ME-principle), yield-
ing system-Z∗ (Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl 1993).
The corresponding Z∗-rankings of the conditionals in
R have to satisfy the following equation (see equation
(16) in (Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl 1993, p. 225))
Z∗(ri) + min
ω|=AiBi
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
Z∗(rj) (17)
= 1 + min
ω|=AiBi
∑
j 6=i
ω|=AjBj
Z∗(rj),
and κ∗ is then calculated by
κ∗(ω) =
∑
ω|=AiBi
Z∗(ri) (18)
(see equation (18) in (Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl
1993, p. 225)). For so-called minimal-core sets – these
are sets R allowing each conditional to be separable
from the other rules by restricting conditional interac-
tions –, a procedure is given to calculate Z∗-rankings
in (Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl 1993).
Like our method, system-Z∗ makes use of summation
instead of maximization, as in system-Z. And equations
(17) determining the Z∗-rankings look similar to our
inequality constraints (9). More exactly, if we follow
the heuristics (10) and set Z∗(ri) = κ
−
i , then system-
Z∗ turns out to be a special instance of our more general
scheme in Corollary 14. In particular, system-Z∗ yields
a c-representation.
This similarity is not accidental – the ME-principle
not only provides a powerful base for system-Z∗, but
also influenced the idea of conditional indifference pre-
sented in this paper. In (Kern-Isberner 1998), we char-
acterized the ME-principle by four axioms, one of which
was the postulate of conditional preservation. Condi-
tional preservation for probability functions there was
realized in full analogy to that for OCF’s defined here.
So both c-representations and ME-distributions comply
with a fundamental principle for representing condition-
als, and it is this principle of conditional preservation
(or principle of conditional indifference, respectively)
that is responsible for a peculiar thoroughness and ac-
curacy when incorporating conditionals. Since we re-
alized this principle completely in a semi-quantitative
setting, we did not have to refer to probabilities and
to ME-distributions, and we were able to formalize the
acceptance conditions, (9), in a purely qualitative man-
ner.
We will illustrate our method by various examples
which are taken from (Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl
1993) and (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1996) to allow a direct
comparison with system-Z and system-Z∗.
Example 16 Consider once again the conditionals
r1, . . . , r5 from Example 6. Here we have Z(r1) =
Z(r4) = Z(r5) = 0 and Z(r2) = Z(r3) = 1 (for the
details, see (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1996, p. 69)). By set-
ting κ−i = Z(ri) + 1 for 1 6 i 6 5, we obtain the same
constants, (13), as in Example 15. Furthermore, by ap-
plying the procedure Z-rank in (Goldszmidt, Morris, &
Pearl 1993), we calculate Z∗(r1) = Z
∗(r4) = Z
∗(r5) =
1 and Z∗(r2) = Z
∗(r3) = 2, therefore also Z
∗(ri) = κ
−
i ,
1 6 i 6 5. So, in this example, κzc from (16) actually is
the OCF from (14) and coincides with κ∗. For instance,
κzc(pb fwa) = 0,
κzc(pbfwa) = κ
−
1 = 1,
κzc(pbfwa) = κ
−
2 + κ
−
3 + κ
−
5 = 5.
In Table 2, we list the ranks of all possible worlds,
first computed by system-Z, according to (15), and then
computed as a c-representation, κzc , of R, according to
(16).
This table reveals clearly that κz is not a c-
representation of R: Associating symbols a+i , a
−
i with
the conditionals ri in R, 1 6 i 6 5, respectively, we ob-
ω κz(ω) κzc(ω) ω κ
z(ω) κzc(ω)
pbfwa 2 2 pbfwa 0 0
pbfwa 2 3 pbfwa 1 1
pbfwa 2 3 pbfwa 1 1
pbfw a 2 4 pbfw a 1 2
pbfwa 1 1 pbfwa 1 1
pbfwa 1 1 pbfwa 1 1
pbfwa 1 2 pbfwa 1 2
pbfw a 1 2 pbfw a 1 2
pbfwa 2 4 pbfwa 0 0
pbfwa 2 5 pbfwa 1 1
pbfwa 2 4 pbfwa 0 0
pbfw a 2 5 pbfw a 1 1
pb fwa 2 2 pb fwa 0 0
pb fwa 2 2 pb fwa 0 0
pb fwa 2 2 pb fwa 0 0
pb fw a 2 2 pb fw a 0 0
Table 2: Rankings for Example 16
tain
σR
(
pbfwa · pbfwa
pbfwa · pbfwa
)
=
a+1 a
+
2 a
−
3 a
+
4 a
+
5 · a
+
1 a
+
4 a
−
5
a+1 a
+
2 a
−
3 a
+
4 a
−
5 · a
+
1 a
+
4 a
+
5
= 1,
but κz
(
pbfwa · pbfwa
pbfwa · pbfwa
)
= κz(pbfwa) + κz(pbfwa)−
κz(pbfwa)− κz(pbfwa) = 2 + 1− 2 = 1 6= 0.
What is the actual benefit of this formal principle of
conditional preservation? Comparing κz(ω) to κzc(ω),
we see that κzc is more fine-grained. Therefore, it rep-
resents more conditionals. Consider, e.g., the condi-
tional (w|pbfa) – does a non-flying, but airborne pen-
guin possess wings or not? κz does not know, we have
κz(pbfaw) = κz(pbfaw) = 1. On the other hand,
κzc accepts this conditional: κ
z
c(pbfaw) = 1 < 2 =
κzc(pbfaw). To show that this is more than pure spec-
ulation, consider the conditional structures of pbfaw
and pbfaw: σR(pbfaw) = a
−
1 a
+
2 a
+
3 a
+
4 , σR(pbfaw) =
a−1 a
+
2 a
+
3 a
−
4 . Thus, except for r4, both worlds behave
exactly the same with respect to the conditionals in R,
but, due to r4, our penguin is supposed to have wings
since it is a bird.
Similar arguments apply when considering the con-
ditionals (a|pbf), (a|pbfw), (w|pbf), (w|pbfa): κz is to-
tally indifferent when confronted with flying super-
penguins - it assigns the same degree of plausibility,
2, to any of the involved worlds. So, it accepts neither
of these conditionals, whereas κzc accepts all of them.
Finally, let us consider the conditional (a|bfw). It
is accepted by κz, as well as by κzc , as may easily be
checked. But what happens when the variable p is taken
into account? κz establishes (a|pbfw), but is undecided
with respect to (a|pbfw). By contrast, κzc not only
accepts both of these conditionals, but also establishes
them with equal strength:
κzc
(
pbfwa
pbfwa
)
= κzc
(
pbfwa
pbfwa
)
= −1. (19)
This is a simple consequence of the principle
of conditional preservation in this case, since
σR
(
pbfwa · pbfwa
pbfwa · pbfwa
)
= 1 (see above). (19) is justified
because each of the involved quotients has the same con-
ditional structure, i.e. shows the same behavior, with
respect to R. By considering arbitrary group elements
in ker σR, even very complicated interrelationships be-
tween degrees of strength associated with conditionals
can be observed.
Therefore, using System-Z and the max-operator
means to establish conditionals only on a superfi-
cial level, whereas obeying the principle of condi-
tional preservation ensures that conditional knowledge
is propagated thoroughly and deeply in plausibility
structures of epistemic states. This well-behavedness
with respect to subconditionals is also observed in
(Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl 1993). It is illustrated
by the next example, too:
Example 17 Consider the conditionals
r1 : (f |s) Swedes are fair-haired.
r2 : (t|s) Swedes are tall.
We apply Corollary 14 and heuristics (10) and calculate
κ−1 , κ
−
2 > 0. So we set κ
−
1 = κ
−
2 = 1, and we obtain
a c-representation, κ, of the form (12). Then not only
the subconditional (f |st) of (f |s) is accepted, but also
the subconditional (f |st), because κ(sft) = 1 < 2 =
κ(sf t).
Goldszmidt, Morris and Pearl (Goldszmidt, Mor-
ris, & Pearl 1993) compared this situation to the one
where instead of r1, r2, merely the conditional (ft|s) is
learned. Here, only the first subconditional, (f |st), is
accepted, but not the second one, (f |st). This becomes
intelligible by considering conditional structures: sft
and sf t both show the same behavior with respect to
(ft|s) (namely, they refute it), while sft and sft show
different behaviors.
Observing conditional structures emphasizes once
again that in general, the joint integration of condition-
als cannot be achieved by learning only one conditional
– conditionals resist to propositional treatment. In our
framework, each conditional constitutes an independent
piece of knowledge.
Finally, let us consider an example that cannot be
dealt with by system-Z∗ in a straightforward man-
ner because the involved set of conditionals is not a
minimal-core set:
Example 18 Let R consist of the rules
r1 : (b|a), r2 : (c|b), r3 : (c|a).
ω σR(ω) ω σR(ω)
abc a+1 a
+
2 a
+
3 abc a
+
2
abc a+1 a
−
2 a
−
3 abc a
−
2
abc a−1 a
+
3 abc 1
abc a−1 a
−
3 abc 1
Table 3: Conditional structures for Example 18
We list the conditional structures in Table 3 to make
argumentation easier. R is not a minimal-core set in the
sense of (Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl 1993) because r3
is only refuted by worlds that also refute either r1 or r2.
So equation (17) is not solvable to yield Z∗-rankings.
For our approach, however, dealing with R is no
problem: Using (10) and (11), we obtain
κ−1 , κ
−
2 > 0, κ
−
3 > 0−min{κ
−
1 , κ
−
2 }
We set κ−1 = κ
−
2 = 1 and κ
−
3 = 0, and we obtain by
(12) an appropriate ranking function, κ (see Table 4).
Actually, r3 seems to be redundant since κ
+
3 = κ
−
3 = 0,
ω κ(ω) κ1(ω) ω κ(ω) κ1(ω)
abc 0 0 abc 0 0
abc 1 2 abc 1 1
abc 1 1 abc 0 0
abc 1 2 abc 0 0
Table 4: Rankings for Example 18
and it is in fact already established by r1 and r2. But
what about the subconditionals (c|ab) and (c|ab) of r3?
While the first one is accepted, due to the impact of r2,
the second subconditional is not, since r3 is taken to be
redundant (see the conditional structures in Table 3).
To ensure the thorough propagation of conditional
knowledge to subconditionals, we have to postulate
κ−i > 0 in (10), in order to protect the influence of
each conditional against numerical cancellations. With
κ−1 = κ
−
2 = κ
−
3 = 1, we obtain the OCF κ1 in Table 4,
which accepts both subconditionals of r3, as desired.
Unifying qualitative and quantitative
approaches
We defined the principle of conditional preservation as
an indifference property of the revised ranking function
(cf. Definition 11) – conditional preservation means to
maintain numerical relationships. Therefore, it appears
here as an essentially quantitative notion. Neverthe-
less, it is applied to ranking functions which are used
in a qualitative, or at least, semi-quantitative setting.
Moreover, note that conditional indifference is based
on the notion of conditional structures which are rep-
resented in a completely symbolic way. So, what is the
connection between the principle of conditional preser-
vation introduced here, and the approaches to condi-
tional preservation in a purely qualitative framework,
as were proposed in (Darwiche & Pearl 1997) and in
(Kern-Isberner 1999b)?
In (Kern-Isberner 1999b), we advanced a set of pos-
tulates apt to guide the revisions of epistemic states, Ψ,
by conditional beliefs, (B|A). There, the idea of condi-
tional preservation was put in formal terms by making
use of two relations, subconditionality, ⊑ (see (2)), and
perpendicularity, ‖ , on the set of conditionals:
(D|C) ‖ (B|A) iff either C |= AB, or AB, or A.
If (D|C) ‖ (B|A), then for all worlds which (D|C) may
be applied to, (B|A) has the same effect and thus, it
yields no further partitioning – (B|A) is irrelevant for
(D|C).
Conditional preservation then was described in
(Kern-Isberner 1999b) by the following three postu-
lates:
(CR5) If (D|C) ‖ (B|A) then Ψ |= (D|C) iff
Ψ ∗ (B|A) |= (D|C).
(CR6) If (D|C) ⊑ (B|A) and Ψ |= (D|C) then
Ψ ∗ (B|A) |= (D|C).
(CR7) If (D|C) ⊑ (B|A) and Ψ∗ (B|A) |= (D|C) then
Ψ |= (D|C).
These axioms cover the postulates of Darwiche and
Pearl in (Darwiche & Pearl 1997) (see (Kern-Isberner
1999b; Kern-Isberner 1999c)) and support their intu-
itive ideas with more formal arguments. Applying Def-
inition 11 to the case R = {(B|A)}, the principle of
conditional preservation reduces to postulate
(κ∗−κ)(ω1) = (κ
∗−κ)(ω2) if (B|A)(ω1) = (B|A)(ω2)
for the revised function κ∗ = κ ∗ R (cf. also (Kern-
Isberner 1999a)). It can then be shown that such a re-
vision also satisfies the postulates (CR5)-(CR7) stated
above (Kern-Isberner 1999a).
This means that the principle of conditional preser-
vation, phrased in its full (numerical) complexity in this
paper, also covers the approaches to conditional preser-
vation proposed in a qualitative framework.
To guarantee the thorough propagation of condi-
tional knowledge to subconditionals, we may supple-
ment (CR5)-(CR7) with another postulate:
(CR8) If (D|C) ⊑ (B|A) and Ψ 6|= (D|C), then
Ψ ∗ (B|A) |= (D|C).
(CR8) clearly exceeds the paradigm of conditional
preservation, in favor of imposing conditional structure
as long as there are no conflicts.
Axioms (CR5)-(CR8) only deal, however, with revis-
ing an epistemic state by one single conditional. A topic
of our ongoing research is to generalize them so as to
apply for incorporating sets of conditionals, too.
Summary and outlook
In this paper, we presented an approach to realize the
idea of conditional preservation in knowledge represen-
tation and belief revision in a very comprehensive way.
We introduced a formal notion of conditional structure
of worlds, and then we phrased a principle of condi-
tional preservation for (revisions of) ordinal conditional
functions as indifference with respect to these struc-
tures. We presented simple schemes to construct ordi-
nal conditional functions observing this principle, and
we compared our approach to system-Z and system-Z∗.
Finally, we showed that the principle formalized here
also covers other, qualitative approaches to conditional
preservation.
In (Kern-Isberner 1999d), we developed these ideas in
an even more general setting, with so-called conditional
valuation functions representing epistemic states. Or-
dinal conditional functions are special instances of these
functions, as well as probability distributions and pos-
sibility distributions. So the principle of conditional
preservation, as was presented here, can be applied
to nearly all major (semi-)quantitative representation
forms for epistemic states. Actually, this paper contin-
ues and extends work begun in (Kern-Isberner 1998).
The algebraic notion of conditional structures of
worlds played a crucial part for conditional preserva-
tion here. Its representation via group theory does not
only provide an elegant methodological framework for
handling conditionals. In (Kern-Isberner 1999d), we
present an approach to solve the “inverse representation
problem” – which conditionals are most appropriate to
represent an epistemic state? – by making extensive
use of group theoretical means to elaborate conditional
structures.
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